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NOTES
RETURN TO THE CUCKOO'S NEST:

AN EXAMINATION OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION REPORT ON PSYCHOSURGERY

One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest' describes the use of
psychosurgery to rid MacMurphy, an inmate-patient who challenged the authority of his "keepers" in a psychiatric institution, of
his allegedly violent tendencies. The operation transformed him
into a human vegetable. His friend, the "Chief," another patient at
the hospital, recognized that MacMurphy's life was now without
meaning and mercifully suffocated him. The author's indictment of
abuses in mental institutions was published in 1962, when the
2
practice of psychosurgery was waning in the United States.
Cuckoo's Nest should belong to a bygone era, one replaced
by an age in which more humane treatments are administered.
However, debate surrounding psychosurgery has again arisen,
and it has been revealed that several hundred psychosurgical procedures are still performed each year in the United States. 3 In
1974, Congress passed the National Research Act 4 which created
the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of
Biomedical and Behavioral Research. One of the duties of the
Commission was to conduct an investigation of psychosurgery in
the United States to determine the appropriateness of its use and
to recommend to the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare
(HEW) standards defining any circumstances under which use of
psychosurgery may be appropriate. 5 The Commission report issued

K. KESEY, ONE FLEW OVER THE CUCKOo's NEST (1962).
2. See note 17 infra and accompanying text.
3. 118 CONG. REC. 5567 (1972) (remarks of Rep. Gallagher). Medical literature
indicates that psychosurgery is being used increasingly to control antisocial behavior,
1.

violence, and hyperactivity. Balasubramanian, Surgical Treatment of Hyperkinetic
and Behavior Disorders, 54 INT'L SURGERY 18 (1970).

4. National Research Service Award Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-348, 88 Stat.
342 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (Supp. V 1975)).
5. National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical
and Behavioral Research, HEW, Use of Psychosurgery in Practice and Research: Report and Recommendations (Mar. 14, 1977), 42 Fed. Reg. 26,318 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Report of the National Commission].
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in March 1977, concluded that psychosurgery is appropriate for
both voluntarily and involuntarily committed patients under certain
circumstances and "encouraged" 6 the Department of HEW to carry
on research to evaluate the safety and efficacy of psychosurgical
procedures. On May 23, 1977, Representative Louis Stokes introduced a measure in the House of Representatives to prohibit the
performance of psychosurgery in "federally connected health care
facilities. "'i The events giving rise to renewed debate over the issues which were raised by the Commission report, informed consent and the rights to receive and to refuse medical treatment, will
be examined in this note.
Psychosurgery is defined in the Commission report as brain
surgery: (1) on physiologically healthy brain tissue of an individual,
who does not suffer from any physical disease, to change or control
his behavior or emotions; or (2) on diseased brain tissue of an individual if the primary purpose of the surgery is to control, change,
or affect any behavioral or emotional disturbance of such individual. 8 Psychosurgical procedures include lobotomy, implantation
of electrodes in the brain, brain stimulation, and direct application
of various substances to the brain. 9 However, the Commission excluded surgical treatment for epilepsy and parkinsonism from the
definition,"0 and the bill to ban psychosurgery excepts "treatment
of a known and diagnosed physical disease of the brain.""1
HISTORY OF PSYCHOSURGERY

The practice of psychosurgery began during the late Middle
Ages when "trephening," drilling a hole in the patient's skull
6. Id. at 26,331.
7. H.R. 7371, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REc. H4830 (daily ed. May 23,

1977). As of the date of publication of this note, no action has been taken on H.R.
7371 by the committees to which it was referred, House Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce and the House Ways and Means Committee.
8.

Report of the National Commission, supra note 5, at 26,318-19. However,

numerous commentators and a landmark decision in the field have emphasized that
psychosurgery is usually performed in the absence of evidence of any abnormality in
the targeted area of brain which has caused the behavioral disorder. See Aden v.
Younger, 57 Cal. App. 3d 662, 129 Cal. Rptr. 535 (4th Dist. 1976); Kaimowitz v.
Department of Mental Health, 1 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 147, 148 (Mich. Cir.
Ct. 1973); Barnhart, Pinkerton & Roth, Informed Consent to Organic Behavior Control, 17 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 39, 57 & nn.67 & 68 (1977).

9. Report of the National Commission, supra note 5, at 26,319.
10. Id.
11. H.R. 7371, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REc. H4830 (daily ed. May
23, 1977). This exception appears to be a fatal flaw because it effectively nullifies the
desired result of the legislation. See text accompanying note 216 infra.
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through the temple, was performed to let "demons," the alleged
causes of mental illness, escape.' 2 Its modem development can be
traced to Europe at the end of the last century. 1 3 In the United
States, surgical procedures, in which fibers between the frontal
lobes and other parts of the brain are severed, were first performed
in the 1930's. 1 4 Approximately 50,000 frontal lobotomies were performed in the United States between 1940 and 1960.15 Although
some favorable results were achieved, enthusiastic lobotomy advocates underplayed some of the effects of the operation: It often
produced partial paralysis, convulsions and loss of bladder control,
and left patients apathetic and intellectually blunted. 16 The use of
lobotomies waned after 1960 with the development of drug therapy
7
1
and electroconvulsive procedures to treat mental illness.
Numerous events led to the revival of interest in psychosurgery. Drug allergies, blood abnormalities, and disorder in muscle
tone and movement were caused by thorazine, a drug widely used
as a chemical lobotomy.' 8 New forms of brain surgery were developed in which the surgeon did not have to cut manually or remove portions of the brain to reach a targeted area.19 In 1967, ,a
year of widespread urban violence in the United States, Doctors
Mark, Sweet, and Ervin, psychosurgery researchers, argued that
these disturbances and other acts of violence might be prevented
by psychosurgery.2 0 Funding was subsequently appropriated by
Congress in 1970 for further research. 2 ' Representative Stokes'
12. See TIME, April 3, 1972, at 50.
13.

See N. KITTRIE, THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT 305 (1971).

14. See Comment, Informed Consent and the Mental Patient: California Recognizes a Mental Patient's Right to Refuse Psychosurgery and Shock Treatment, 15
SANTA CLARA LAW, 725, 735-36 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Informed Consent].
15. Restak, The Promise and Peril of Psychosurgery, SATURDAY REV./WORLD,

September 25, 1973, at 54, 55-56; Informed Consent, supra note 14, at 736.
16.

N. KrTIE, supra note 13, at 305-06.

17. Trotter, A Clockwork Orange in a California Prison, 101 SC. NEWS 174
(1972); Informed Consent, supra note 14, at 736.
18. Restak, supra note 15, at 56.
19. Chorover, Psychosurgerj: A Neuropsychological Perspective, 54 B.U.L.
REv. 231, 235-36 (1974). These procedures include stereotaxic surgery, in which
electrodes attached to fine wires are threaded into the brain to the target area, following an elaborate coordinate system where ultrasonic beams and radiation transmission are aimed at pinpointed targets.
20.

V. MARK & F. ERviN, VIOLENCE AND THE BRAIN 69-91 (1970); Mark,

Sweet, & Ervin, The Role of Brain Disease in Riots and Urban Violence, 201 J. Am.
Med. A., No. 11 (1967).
21. The money was appropriated to the Neuro-Research Foundation at Boston
City Hospital. The grant was made on the condition that no research on human subjects would be conducted. Informed Consent, supra note 14, at 738 n.88; Restak,
supra note 15, at 57.
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concern that any group in power might use psychosurgery as a tool
to suppress minorities grew out of these reports.2 2 Little research
had been done to evaluate the effectiveness and safety of
psychosurgery; 23 in 1973, during Senate debate on the National
Research Act, an amendment was proposed which provided for a
two-year moratorium on psychosurgery until the Commission,
created by the Act, could complete a study of the use and efficacy
of such operations. 2 4 Ironically, the amendment was deleted because "Congress had insufficient information to justify such a measure."2 5 Approximately five to seven hundred psychosurgical proce26
dures are still performed annually in the United States.
NATURE OF PSYCHOSURGERY

The replacement of lobotomies with drug therapy was met
27
favorably:
Time and experience had tarnished the operation's early promise. Schizophrenics before lobotomy were schizophrenics after.
The procedure was less a cure than a pacifier. Many patients
became less volatile and easier to manage after lobotomy, but
instead of emptying the hospitals, the operation began to fill
them with a new type of patient, whose stereotype was the postoperative vegetable ....

28

Psychosurgery is an experimental procedure 29 and is generally con22. Interview with Peggy Jones, Assistant to Representative Stokes (Aug. 1,
1977). Stokes was not the first to suggest this possibility. The use and present feasibility of psychosurgery as a means of social control has been discussed. See Older,
Psychosurgery: Ethical Issues and a Proposal for Control, 44 AM. J. OnrHo-

661, 671 (1974). The Commission was also aware of this danger. See Report of the National Commission, supra note 5, at 26,327.
23. Informed Consent, supra note 14, at 737.
24. Report of the National Commission, supra note 5, at 26,319.
25. Id.
26. Offir, Psychosurgery and the Law-The Movement to Pull Out the ElecPSYCHIATRY

trodes, PSYCH. TODAY, May 1974, at 69.

27. See generally Older, supra note 22.
28. Id. at 661.
29. This proposition has been enunciated by courts and by commentators. See
Aden v. Younger, 57 Cal. App. 3d 662, 671, 129 Cal. Rptr. 535, 541 (4th Dist. 1976);
Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, 1 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 147
(Mich. Cir. Ct. 1973); Older, supra note 22, at 662; Barnhart, Pinkerton, & Roth,
supra note 8, at 58. The Aden court examined California legislation severely restricting the use of psychosurgery. The Kaimowitz court held that an involuntarily confined mental patient could not give informed consent to a proposed psychosurgical
procedure. The patient could not make a knowledgeable decision, one of the requisites for informed consent, because psychosurgery is still experimental and doctors
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sidered a treatment of last resort. 30 Psychosurgery is experimental
31
in that scientists cannot ascertain why it works when it works.
Admittedly, healthy brain cells are destroyed to alter the thoughts
and behavior of a mentally ill individual.3 2 Although lesions in a
particular area of the brain of many individuals will produce similar
results, man's understanding of the brain's functions is too primitive to permit a determination of how the procedure produces its
effects. 3 Why, then, is psychosurgery performed? Valuable insight
34
into this question can be obtained from the Commission report.
The Commission based its empirical findings on two postoperative
studies of sixty-one patients who had received operations during
the period 1965-1975.3 5 The studies drew upon interviews and objective tests. 36 They demonstrated that "(1) more than half of the
patients improved significantly following psychosurgery, although a
themselves do not have enough knowledge to convey to the patient to allow him to
make a legally informed decision.
30. Report of the National Commission, supra note 5, at 26,326 (summary of
statement of John Donnelly, M.D., made at public hearing held by the Commission
on June 11, 1976). See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 426.700-.755 (1975). This statute requires
that all alternative treatments and therapies be attempted before psychosurgery is
performed. Id. § 426.720(3)(d). If it is to be performed, the statute limits the use of
psychosurgery to instances where it is necessary to save life or alleviate suffering. Id.
§ 426.720(3)(c). One of the treatments for mental illness often used prior to psychosurgery is electroconvulsive treatment (ECT). The Aden decision found that
ECT is generally accepted throughout the medical community as a form of treatment for certain types of mental illness, particularly manic depression and schizophrenia. See Aden v. Younger, 57 Cal. App. 3d 662, 684, 129 Cal. Rptr. 535, 549 (4th
Dist. 1976). However, it has been argued that since there is no consensus as to how
ECT affects the brain and how it changes behavior, and because the hazards of
ECT are as deleterious as those of psychosurgery, ECT should also be labeled an
experimental procedure and its use severely limited. See Informed Consent, supra
note 14, at 745-52.
31.

Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, 1 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP.

147, 148-49 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1973).
32.
33.

R. SLOVENKO, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAw 243, 248 (1973).
Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, 1 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP.

147, 148 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1973); Restak, supra note 15, at 56. Man's lack of knowledge
concerning the brain is not the only reason why psychosurgery is an experimental
procedure. In addition to, and as a direct result of, this lack of knowledge, the term
mental illness has no fixed meaning. See Barnhart, Pinkerton, & Roth, supra note 8,
at 42.
34. Report of the National Commission, supra note 5, at 26,319.
35. Id. at 26,329.
36. Tests included the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, Benton's Visual Retention Test, and the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task. Mirsky & Orzack, Final Report
on Psychosurgery Pilot Study, in THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION
OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, APPENDIX: PSYCHOSURGERY 11-31 (1977).
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few were worse and some unchanged and (2) none of the patients
experienced significant neurological or psychological impairment attributable to the surgery."3 7 The Commission emphasized that the
vast majority of the patients did not undergo preoperative evaluations against which gains or losses clearly attributable to surgical
intervention could be measured. 38 It concluded that the studies
"appear to rebut any presumption that all forms of psychosurgery
are unsafe and ineffective." 39 Since it found that some forms of
psychosurgery have therapeutic value, 4 0 the Commission did not
recommend a wholesale ban on psychosurgery. While the Commission recognized the potential abuses of psychosurgery,4 1 it pro4 2
posed safeguards which could effectively eliminate the dangers.
Amid charges that psychosurgery is merely experimental and
has a great potential for abuse, 4 3 the concern arose that patients
give informed consent 44 to proposed psychosurgery. The Commission recommended that an Institutional Review Board (IRB)45 be
established at every mental institution to assure that a patient who
37. Report of the National Commission, supra note 5, at 26,329. The studies
were conducted by two neuropsychologists at Boston University and two neuropsychologists and one neurologist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
38. Id. at 26,323. Eighteen of the 34 patients evaluated in Teuber's study had
undergone preoperative examinations. This lack of preoperative evaluation and inherent subjectivity of evaluation has been one of the criticisms of psychosurgeons'
work. See, e.g., E. VALENSTEIN, BRAIN CONTROL 296 (1973). Without such evalua-

tion, critics contend, it is impossible to conclude that psychosurgery is beneficial. Id.
39. Report of the National Commission, supra note 5, at 26,329.
40. Id.
41. Id. The Commission stated:
The Commission affirms that the use of psychosurgery for any purpose
other than to provide treatment to individual patients would be inappropriate and should be prohibited.Accordingly, the Commission is recommending safeguards that should prevent the performance of psychosurgery for
purposes of social or institutional control or other such misuse.
Id. (emphasis in original).
42. The Commission recommended that all proposed psychosurgical procedures be reviewed by an Institutional Review Board (IRB) approved by the U.S.
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) and comprised of a neurosurgeon, a psychiatrist, a neurologist, and a psychologist. The IRB would carry out
preoperative and postoperative evaluations to determine the competence of the surgeon as well as assess whether proper consent had been given by the patient or his
guardian to protect the patient's rights. Id. See notes 167-202 infra and accompanying text. Judicial review of all IRB decisions was recommended only in cases involving involuntarily committed mental patients. Report of the National Commission,
supra note 5, at 26,330.
43. Id. at 26,329; see generally Older, supra note 22.
44. Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, 1 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP.
147, 150 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1973).
45. See note 42 supra.
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is capable of consenting to an operation has provided informed consent before psychosurgery is performed. 8
INFORMED CONSENT

The recognition of a physician's duty to obtain informed consent before administering medical treatment is a relatively new development in American law. It has grown from the notion that a
physician is obligated to disclose information to the patient about
treatment. The modem concept of informed consent originated at
47
the beginning of the twentieth century in Hunter v. Burroughs,
where the Supreme Court of Virginia stated that "it is the duty of a
physician in the exercise of ordinary care to warn a patient of the
danger of possible bad consequences of using a remedy." 48
The extent of disclosure which a physician must provide has
been at issue since Burroughs. Under the full disclosure standard,
liability is founded on a physician's failure to provide the patient
with sufficient information to make a meaningful choice based on
the risks inherent in the treatment and the consequences of foregoing it. 4 9 This standard does not apply to all forms of treatment.
Only limited disclosure is required for "common," as opposed to
"complicated," treatments. 5 0 If a proposed treatment is common,

46. The Commission recommended that under certain circumstances, psychosurgery should be performed on patients who cannot themselves provide informed
consent. Report of the National Commission, supra note 5, at 26,330. See text accompanying notes 119 & 120 infra.

47. 123 Va. 113, 96 S.E. 360 (1918).
48. Id. at 133, 96 S.E. at 366. Plaintiff sued his doctor to recover for bums he
sustained as a result of X-ray treatments administered to treat a skin disorder. Plaintiff asserted that the physician was negligent for breaching his duty to inform the
patient of the potential dangers involved in the X-ray treatment and that the treatment was negligently administered. Id. at 119-22, 96 S.E. at 362-63. The court found
that the patient was misled by the physician since the physician had given assurances of recovery. Id. at 133-34, 96 S.E. at 366-67. However, the court determined
that plaintiff failed to satisfy his burden of proving that the treatment was administered negligently and decided for the defendant. Id. at 146, 96 S.E. at 371.
49. Failure to obtain informed consent was first recognized as a possible basis
of recovery for battery in Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal.
App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1st Dist. 1957). In Salgo the court suggested that full
disclosure of all risks would be required when a physician seeks to obtain consent to
surgery from a patient. In all cases which exceed minimal, routine treatments or
where the patient is highly emotional, the physician may exercise his discretion in
determining the amount of information he discloses. The court stated that a doctor
always has a duty to fully reveal all the facts the patient needs to issue a meaningful
consent. See id. at 518, 317 P.2d at 181.
50. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972).
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the physician need not describe remote risks. 5 ' If the procedure is
complicated, the physician is obliged to describe all possible risks
regardless of how remote they are.5 2 Under the limited disclosure
standard, plaintiff must prove not only that the doctor failed to
inform him of the risks involved, but also that this failure to inform
constituted a deviation from the custom of other physicians practicing in the community.5 3
Recent cases, however, appear to favor the full disclosure approach. 5 4 In Cobbs v. Grant,55 the California Supreme Court
adopted the full disclosure standard. The court criticized the limited disclosure approach because its vagueness effectively vests the
physician with absolute discretion. 56 According to this court, the
only time a patient should be denied the opportunity to weigh the
risks is where it is evident that he cannot evaluate data, that is,
where there is an emergency or the patient is a child or an incompetent. 5 7 In addition, the Texas Supreme Court in Wilson v. Scott, 58
while not adopting the full discosure standard, may have weakened
the limited disclosure test when it applied this test and found that
the practice of physicians in the community where defendant practiced was to provide full disclosure. 59
The highly intrusive and experimental nature of psychosurgery
and the trend of judicial opinions mandate that full disclosure to
prospective patients be required to satisfy the informed consent
requirement. 60 But it is arguable whether a mentally ill individual
can give informed consent. If so, what elements, if any, in addition
to full disclosure must be present to determine whether the requirement has been satisfied?

51. Id. at 244, 502 P.2d at 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 515.
52. Id. The court stated that the physician need not give the patient a lengthy
discourse or a mini-course in medical science, but rather must discuss the risk of
death or bodily injury and the problems of recuperation. Id.
53. Note, Informed Consent-A Proposed Standard for Medical Disclosure, 48
N.Y.U.L. REV. 548, 551 (1973).
54. Kessenick & Mankin, Medical Malpractice: The Right to Be Informed, 8
U.S.F.L. REv. 261, 270 (1973).
55. 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972).
56. Id. at 243, 502 P.2d at 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 514.
57. Id.
58. 412 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1967).
59. Id. at 303.
60. See Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, 1 MENTAL DISABILITY L.
REP. 147 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1973).
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Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health
In Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health,61 a landmark
decision in the field of psychosurgery, the court held that an involuntarily confined mental patient was unable to give informed
consent to a proposed psychosurgical procedure. 62 The case involved a mental patient who had been committed to a state hospital under Michigan's criminal sexual psychopath law for raping and
murdering a nurse at another mental institution. He and his parents
signed consent forms allowing him to participate in a state-sponsored experimental psychosurgical program 63 designed to control
violent behavior in persons suffering from uncontrollable aggression. 64 Kaimowitz, a Detroit attorney, brought suit on behalf of
Louis Smith, the subject of the proposed experiment, and all
others similarly situated, seeking a writ of habeas corpus. The
complaint alleged that Smith "was being illegally detained in the
'
Lafayette Clinic for the purpose of experimental psychosurgery. "65
As a result of adverse publicity generated by the case, the project
was terminated. The court, however, denied defendant's motion to
dismiss based on mootness because the project might be revived at
a future date and the issues raised were "ripe for declaratory judgment." 66
The court framed two issues for consideration: The first was
whether an involuntarily detained mental patient can give legally
adequate informed consent to experimental psychosurgery when
the experiment is designed to alter thoughts, emotions, or behavior. The second issue was, assuming he can consent, can the
State Department of Mental Health legally conduct experimental
psychosurgery on involuntarily confined mental patients in hospitals under its jurisdiction. 67 Since it answered the first question in
61. Id.
62. Id. at 151.

63. Id. at 147.
64. The Michigan Legislature appropriated funds for 24 criminal sexual
psychopaths in the state's mental health system to be subjects of the experiment. The
experiment was to compare the effect of surgery on the limbic portion of the brain
with the effect of a drug on the male hormone flow. "The comparison was intended
to show which, if either, could be used in controlling aggression of males in an
institutional setting, and to afford lasting permanent relief from such aggression to
the patient." Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 147-48.
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the negative, the court never considered the second issue. 68
To ascertain the elements of informed consent, the court examined the judgments of the Nuremberg military tribunals that tried
Nazi war criminals following World War II. Standards for medical
experimentation on humans were enunciated at the Nuremberg
tribunals in United States v. Brandt.69 The Kaimowitz court gleaned

68. Id. at 153.
69. II Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals 171
(1947). The court stated:
1. The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential.
This means that the person involved should have legal capacity to give consent; should be so situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice,
without the intervention of any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, overreaching, or other ulterior form of constraint or coercion; and should have
sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the elements of the subject matter involved as to enable him to make an understanding and enlightened
decision. This latter element requires that before the acceptance of an affirmative decision by the experimental subject there should be made known to
him the nature, duration, and purpose of the experiment; the method and
means by which it is to be conducted; all inconveniences and hazards reasonably to be expected; and the effects upon his health or person which may
possibly come from his participation in the experiment.
The duty and responsibility for ascertaining the quality of the consent
rests upon each individual who initiates, directs or engages in the experiment. It is a personal duty and responsibility which may not be delegated to
another with impunity.
2. The experiment should be such as to yield fruitful results for the
good of society, unprocurable by other methods or means of study, and not
random and unnecessary in nature.
3. The experiment should be so designed and based on the results of
animal experimentation and a knowledge of the natural history of the disease or other problem under study that the anticipated results will justify the
performance of the experiment.
4. The experiment should be so conducted as to avoid all unnecessary
physical and mental suffering and injury.
5. No experiment should be conducted where there is an a priori reason to believe that death or disabling injury will occur; except, perhaps, in
those experiments where the experimental physicians also serve as subjects.
6. The degree of risk to be taken should never exceed that determined
by the humanitarian importance of the problem to be solved by the experiment.
7. Proper preparations should be made and adequate facilities provided
to protect the experimental subject against even remote possibilities of injury, disability, or death.
8. The experiment should be conducted only by scientifically qualified
persons. The highest degree of skill and care should be required through all
stages of the experiment of those who conduct or engage in the experiment.
9. During the course of the experiment the human subject should be at
liberty to bring the experiment to an end if he has reached the physical or
mental state where continuation of the experiment seems to him to be impossible.
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three elements of informed consent from the Nuremberg standards:
70
competence, knowledge, and voluntariness.

Competence, the court stated, "requires the ability of the subject to understand rationally the nature of the procedure, its risks,
and other relevant information." 7 1 The court stated that the nature
of his incarceration diminishes the involuntarily confined mental
patient's capacity to consent to psychosurgery, 72 even if he possesses
the intelligence to understand the nature of the procedure. Based
upon statements by counsel for defendant-doctors and testimony
presented at trial, 73 the court observed that institutionalization
tends to strip an individual of his self-worth and his physical and
mental integrity. 74 The court in Kaimowitz employed the testimony
of Louis Smith as an example. Smith testified that it was very unusual for him to be consulted by his doctor about his preference
regarding treatment. 75 Thus, the court found that Smith was not
competent to give consent to the proposed surgery. Further, the
court asserted that in the case of psychosurgery, if the patient is
not competent to give consent, neither is his guardian competent
76
to consent for him.
10. During the course of the experiment the scientist in charge must be
prepared to terminate the experiment at any stage, if he has probably [sic]

cause to believe, in the exercise of the good faith, superior skill and careful
judgment required of him that a continuation of the experiment is likely to
result in injury, disability, or death to the experimental subject.
Id. at 181-82.
70. Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, 1 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP.
147, 150-51 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1973).
71. Id. at 150.
72. Id.
73. Counsel for the physician-defendants acknowledged that a capable doctor
could elicit a patient's consent to nearly any procedure where the patient has been
treated for a serious illness. Id. at 149.
74. Id. at 150.
75. Id.
76. Id. The court may have dismissed the issue of guardian consent too lightly.
It has been held that guardians of voluntarily and involuntarily committed patients
cannot consent to have psychosurgery performed because they have no standing to
assert the rights of the patient. Aden v. Younger, 57 Cal. App. 3d 662, 681, 129 Cal.
Rptr. 535, 547 (4th Dist. 1976). The court did not explain its position. See notes
152-153 infra and accompanying text. One commentator has argued that guardian
consent for an experimental procedure such as psychosurgery is never valid. See
Comment, Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health: Involuntary Mental Patient
Cannot Give Informed Consent to Experimental Psychosurgery, 4 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & SOC. CHANGE 207, 217 (1974). Since psychosurgery is experimental and so little is known about it, the author claims a guardian cannot provide informed consent any more than can an incompetent patient. Id. To allow guardian consent in this
setting would result in the exploitation of incompetent patients since they might be
used in an experiment to which their guardians consented, while a competent pa-
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The court reasoned that the involuntarily committed patient's
lack of competency cannot be ameliorated by full disclosure of the
proposed psychosurgery, its potential benefits and hazards, and
problems in recuperation, 77 because medical science simply does
not have sophisticated knowledge of the nexus betveen the limbic
system of the brain, the area slated for surgery, 78 and human behavior. 79 The court asserted that there is no medically recognized
syndrome for aggression, that the potential risks in performing
psychosurgery are unknown, and that psychosurgery is generally
considered a treatment of last resort.80 Therefore, the court in
'
Kaimowitz concluded that psychosurgery is "clearly experimental," 81
that the record illustrated that benefits of the proposed psychosurgical procedure were uncertain at best,8 2 and that the procedure
could possibly have severe side effects.8 3 Since his doctors were
not particularly knowledgeable about psychosurgery, Smith could
not possibly have given knowledgeable consent.8 4
tient could refuse to submit to the experiment. Id. However, where the treatment is
not experimental, a guardian may consent on behalf of the patient. Id. For a case in
which a guardian consented to the termination of nonexperimental treatment, see In
re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976). Indeed, in some cases, such as proposed
surgery on a minor, guardian consent is a necessary prerequisite. See, e.g., Bonner v.
Moran, 126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
77. For a discussion of the full and limited disclosure standards, see notes
47-59 supra and accompanying text.
78. Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, 1 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP.
147, 147 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1973). The limbic system is thought to be the "emotions center" of the brain. Restak, supra note 15, at 56. This is the area in which some believe
aggression originates, Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, 1 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 147, 147 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1973).
79. Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, 1 MENTAL DISABILITY L,REP.
147, 148 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1973). The court mentioned a statement by Doctors Mark,
Sweet, and Ervin in which they noted the primitive state of our understanding of
the specific portion of the limbic system targeted for surgery, the amygdala. It is
interesting that these same researchers have been among the most ardent advocates
of psychosurgery for the purpose of eliminating violent behavior. See note 20 supra
and accompanying text.
80. Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, 1 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP.
147, 148 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1973).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 149. Doctors, who were expert witnesses at trial, agreed that at the
present time, psychosurgery does not provide any assurance of calming violent patients. Indeed, the court pointed to evidence that psychosurgery could result in
heightened rage instead of placidity. Accord, Statement of Dr. Ayub Ommaya, Acting
Chief, Surgical Neurology Branch, National Institute of Neurological and Communicative Diseases and Stroke, in Restak, supra note 15, at 57.
83. The side effects include flattening of emotional responses, lack of abstract
reasoning ability, loss of capacity for new learning, memory loss, and general sedation and apathy. Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, 1 MENTAL DISABILITY
L. REP. 147, 149 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1973).
84. Id. at 150-51.
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The court concluded its evaluation of informed consent by examining voluntariness. The inability of the involuntarily confined
patient to consent completely to psychosurgery is associated with
his inability to choose voluntarily to undergo or to refuse psychosurgery. Nearly every important aspect of Smith's life was determined
without his participation in decisionmaking. 8 5 The court noted,
based upon testimony by the defendant-physicians, 8 6 that a doctor can persuade his patient to consent to almost anything. 8 7 The
court thus found that Smith could not exercise his power of free
choice without the intervention of an "ulteriorform of constraint or
coercion,"8 8 as required by the Nuremberg standards. Since Smith
could not competently, knowledgeably, or voluntarily choose to
undergo psychosurgery, the court held that he could not provide
informed consent and that the operation could not be performed on
him under any circumstances.
Kaimowitz is important because it is the first thorough judicial
analysis of informed consent in the context of psychosurgery. It has
not been the final discourse on the issue. The National Commission
believed that Kaimowitz went too far in limiting the access of a
patient to a procedure which might be of therapeutic value.8 9 Although the Commission acknowledged that psychosurgery is experimental, 90 and that the dangers of psychosurgery cannot be eliminated entirely, the Commission asserted that its use as a means of
institutional or social control and as pure medical experimentation
without regard to the patient could be eliminated by the establishment of IRB's. 9 1 These Boards would assure that informed consent has been given. Where informed consent cannot be obtained
from the patient, the Commission would allow a guardian to consent to psychosurgery for the patient, 92 a point expressly rejected
in Kaimowitz.
85. Id. at 151.
86. Id. at 149; see note 73 supra and accompanying text.
87. Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, 1 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP.
147, 149 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1973).
88. Id. at 151. The Nuremberg standards are enumerated at note 69 supra.
89. Report of the National Commission, supra note 5, at 26,323.
90. At the outset of its recommendations, the Commission noted the experimental nature of psychosurgery, stating that the safety and efficacy of psychosurgical procedures have yet to be determined. See id. at 26,329. The strict review procedures
which it recommended further indicate this view. See id. This is not surprising since
the overwhelming majority of the evidence presented before the Commission indicated that psychosurgery is experimental.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 26,330.
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THE COMMISSION REPORT

The Commission began with the premise that some forms of
psychosurgery provide effective treatment. 93 It based its conclusion
upon postoperative evaluations of sixty-one patients who had undergone psychosurgery between 1965 and 1975. 94 The Commission
stated that more than half of the sixty-one patients improved significantly after the operation. 95 An examination of each of the four
studies performed for the Commission, however, reveals that only
one or two more patients improved than the number who did not
improve or who regressed. 9 6 Side effects caused by the psychosurgery which were enumerated in the studies 97 were not mentioned
in the Commission report. The studies did not show psychosurgery to be effective but, according to the Commission, merely
rebutted the presumption that all psychosurgery is ineffective.98
Hence, the report implicitly recognized exactly what the Kaimowitz
court found, that there is no evidence that psychosurgery is sufficiently effective to be characterized as an accepted treatment:
Rather, it is merely an experimental procedure.
This conclusion is supported by two of the Commission's recommendations. It first recommended that no individual undergo
psychosurgery until "[a] national psychosurgery advisory board has
determined that the specific psychosurgical procedure has demonstrable benefit for the treatment of an individual with the psychiatric symptom or disorder of the patient."9 9 Second, it recommended
that the federal government "conduct and support studies to
evaluate the safety of specific psychosurgical procedures and the
efficacy of such procedures in relieving specific psychiatric symptoms and disorders."'10 0 These recommendations indicate the
Commission's recognition both of the dearth of knowledge about
psychosurgery and the dubiousness of this procedure's efficacy.
Thus, the Commission and the Kaimowitz court reached similar
conclusions on the present state of knowledge about the nature of
psychosurgery. These two sources differ in their view of informed
consent. Unfortunately, in its effort to criticize and downplay
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 26,329.
Id.
Id.
Mirsky & Orzack, supra note 36, at 11-126.
Id.
Report of the National Commission, supra note 5, at 26,329.
Id. at 26,330. (emphasis in original).
Id. at 26,331. (emphasis in original).
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Kaimowitz, the Commission did not properly emphasize two
points.
The Commission concluded that informed consent can be
given by or on behalf of voluntarily and involuntarily committed
patients;' 0 ' informed consent can be effectively guaranteed by the
establishment of IRB's' 0 2 to review each proposal of psychosurgery.
The Commission attempted to ameliorate the problems articulated
by commentators and by the Kainowitz court by requiring the
IRB first to determine the competence of the surgeon to conduct
preoperative evaluations and second to assess the appropriateness
of the procedure for the patient and conduct postoperative evaluations in addition to assuring that informed consent is given.10 3 The
Commission did not specify what elements should be examined to
determine whether the patient has truly given informed consent.
The Commission agreed with the finding in Kaimowitz that institutionalization diminishes a patient's capacity to provide voluntary
consent.' 0 4 It concluded, however, that diminished capacity is insufficient reason to deny a patient the possible benefit that psycho05
surgery might provide. '
One basis for the Commission's recommendations was an Oregon legislative scheme' 0 6 enacted in 1975. This statute created a
single state Psychosurgery Review Board.' 0 7 The Board is comprised of nine members from the medical, psychiatric and neuroscientific professions and two members of the general public, at
least one of whom is an attorney.' 0 8 Unlike the Commission's recommendations, the statute details a method of assuring informed
consent. The Oregon Board is required to hold a hearing, at which
the patient may be represented by legal counsel,' 0 9 to determine
101. Id. at 26,330.
102. Id. at 26,329. See note 42 supra.
103. Report of the National Commission, supra note 5, at 26,329. The makeup
of the IRB is not discussed in the report. However, written testimony submitted to
the Commission and reproduced in the report contended that neurosurgeons alone
are not sufficiently objective to select patients for psychosurgery. Input is needed
from other professions. Id. at 26,328 (statement of Ernest A. Bates, M.D.). See, e.g.,
OR. REV. STAT. § 426.750 (1975). See also text accompanying note 112 infra.

104. Report of the National Commission, supra note 5, at 26,331. See notes
73-75 supra and accompanying text.
105. Report of the National Commission, supra note 5, at 26,331.
106. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 426.700-.755 (1975). See Report of the National Commission, supra note 5, at 26,323.
107.

OR. REV. STAT. § 426.750 (1975).

108. Id.
109. Due process may require that the patient be represented by legal counsel
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whether or not informed consent was given. 110 The Oregon legislature adopted the informed consent standards enunciated in Kainowitz-knowledge, voluntariness, and competency. On the issue of
knowledge, the statute requires disclosure to the patient of the procedures to be followed and identification of those which are experimental; it also necessitates disclosure of attendant risks and benefits, alternative treatments, and the patient's ability to withdraw
his consent and discontinue the treatment at any time. It must
also be disclosed that the physician will answer any question the
patient asks, that the patient or his legal guardian has the right
to be represented by counsel, and that if the patient cannot afford
one counsel will be appointed for him."' The statute further provides that the Board determine the appropriateness of the operation for the patient by use of clinical data and permits. However, it
does not require the Board to conduct an independent preoperative evaluation of data on the patient. 112 It declares that
used only after all
psychosurgery is a treatment of last resort, to be
1 13
other known treatments have been attempted.
The Commission did not entirely follow its stated model.
Nowhere in the report is it recommended that psychosurgery be
used as a treatment of last resort, nor is the right to counsel

throughout all proceedings starting from the time psychosurgery is proposed. In
Wyatt v. Hardin, 1 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 55 (M.D. Ala. 1975), the court set
minimum constitutional requirements for the employment of "certain extraordinary
or potentially hazardous modes of treatment." Id. at 55. The court banned
psychosurgery in all hospitals maintained by the Alabama Department of Mental
Health and severely restricted the use of electroconvulsive therapy and of aversive
conditioning. Both a Human Rights Committee and an Extraordinary Treatment
Committee must approve the proposed treatment. The patient must be represented
by counsel, the court ordered, to assure that all alternative forms of treatment have
been examined and that the patient has given informed consent. See id. at 56. Hardin was innovative in its approach to assure the patient's right to refuse treatment.
See notes 206-208 infra and accompanying text on the right to refuse treatment.
However, even before Hardin, courts had recognized an individual's right to counsel
in other proceedings in the mental health field. Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393
(10th Cir. 1968), held that every subject of involuntary commitment proceedings
has the right to counsel at each stage of the proceedings. See id. at 396.
Accord, Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972). If an individual is
entitled to counsel at commitment hearings, he should have the right to counsel
before surgery is performed on his brain.
110.

OR. REv. STAT. §§ 426.710, 426.715 (1975).

111. Id. § 426.715.
112. Id. § 426.720.
113. Id.
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guaranteed in proceedings before the IRB. i14 The Commission was
more explicit than was the Oregon statute in recognizing the deterioration in voluntariness caused by institutionalization."1 ' However, the statute indicates that the Oregon legislators agreed with
the conclusion of the Commission. The bulk of this statute deals
with strict disclosure requirements, examination by an impartial
body, notice of all proceedings to the patient's guardian and the
requirement that the patient be represented by counsel.'1 6 That
such strict review is required indicates the legislature's recognition
that an institutionalized mental patient has diminished voluntariness. The Commission's proposed review procedures are not nearly
as stringent as are the statute's procedures. The Commission's procedures should have paralleled the law more closely to avoid or at
least to reduce the impact of diminished voluntariness.
There is, however, one exception to the Commission's laxity.
The Commission distinguished patients who commit themselves
voluntarily from those who are involuntarily committed."i 7 The
Commission recommended that a voluntary inmate should not
undergo psychosurgery until after the IRB has determined that he
has given informed consent. 1 8 If he cannot give informed consent,
his guardian may consent in his place."i 9 Guardian consent is also
permissible in the case of an involuntarily committed patient who
cannot provide informed consent. However, in this case, guardian
consent is subject to mandatory judicial review and the court must
approve the psychosurgery recommended by the IRB before it may
be performed.12 0 The Oregon legislation does not provide for judicial review.
It has been argued that judicial scrutiny should be mandatory
for all proposed psychosurgical procedures because a court is the
only forum in which an individual's rights can be protected., 2 ' Indeed, one member of the Commission dissented from the majority
114.

Not providing for the right to counsel may be unconstitutional. See note

109 supra.
115.

See notes 104 & 105 supra and accompanying text.

116. See note 109 supra and accompanying text.
117. Report of the National Commission, supra note 5, at 26,330. The
Kaimowitz court was not presented with this problem and did not consider it.
118. Id.
119. See note 76 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of guardian consent.
120. Report of the National Commission, supra note 5, at 26,330-31.
121. Informed Consent, supra note 14, at 728-29.
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recommendation, arguing that judicial review of IRB determinations with respect to both voluntarily and involuntarily committed
patients should be mandatory. 122 She cited the effect of institutionalization on the ability of all patients to give informed consent. 12 3 Since individuals who "voluntarily" enter institutions may
not do so entirely as a product of their free will,1 2 4 she asserted
that no distinction should be made between voluntarily and involuntarily admitted patients. Despite its approval of the California
legislation, the Commission did not go far enough in guaranteeing
that patients' rights will be safeguarded and that informed consent
must be given.
There is ample evidence that institutionalization diminishes a
patient's ability to give voluntary consent; 1 25 since courts are "singularly equipped to insure adherence to . . . due process and fundamental fairness,"' 126 all IRB approvals of proposed surgery should
be subject to mandatory judicial review.
The case which the Commission adopted as a guide and from
which it drew the purported distinction between voluntarily and
127 It
involuntarily committed mental patients is Aden v. Younger.
also used Aden to criticize Kaimowitz. Aden was a California action
brought by a physician on behalf of two institutionalized mentally
ill individuals challenging legislative changes in the law governing
the manner in which a patient may consent to psychosurgery and
electroconvulsive therapy (ECT). One petitioner wanted to receive

122. Report of the National Commission, supra note 5, at 26,332 (dissenting
statement of Patricia A. King).
123. See notes 73-75 supra and accompanying text.
124. Ms. King indicated that as part of "plea bargaining," some persons may
"agree" to voluntarily commit themselves to mental institutions in exchange for reduced or dropped charges. See Report of the National Commission, supra note 5, at
26,332 (dissenting statement of Patricia A. King). Another example, not cited in the
dissent, is that individuals may agree to institutionalization after strong pressure from
their families. In these instances, the patient's voluntariness may be in doubt.
125. See notes 72-75 supra and accompanying text.
126. Informed Consent, supra note 14, at 729.
127. 57 Cal. App. 3d 662, 129 Cal. Rptr. 535 (4th Dist. 1976). This case was
brought in the appeals court. The court had original jurisdiction under state common
law interpreting CAL. R. CT. 56(a)(1). This rule grants appellate courts original jurisdiction where "proper." The court found that since the constitutionality of a state
law was challenged and the rights of mental patients would be dramatically affected
by delaying a decision on the constitutionality of the legislation, it had original jurisdiction. See Aden v. Younger, 57 Cal. App. 3d 662, 670, 129 Cal. Rptr. 535, 540 (4th
Dist. 1976).
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ECT and the other sought psychosurgery.' 2 8 The opinion does not
indicate whether petitioners had been voluntarily or involuntarily
committed.
The California statute 129 challenged in Aden modified previous
legislation; it was aimed at protecting the right of mental patients
to refuse treatment and at preventing unnecessary administration of
hazardous and intrusive treatments.' 30 Voluntarily as well as involuntarily committed mental patients were included within the
scope of this statutory Bill of Rights for mental patients. 13 1 The
court stated that this recognizes that the voluntary and involuntary
labels do not always indicate the voluntariness of a specific patient's consent.13 2 Thus, the court implicitly acknowledged the effect of institutionalization on a person's ability to make voluntary
133
choices.
A former provision which allowed the denial of a patient's
right to refuse treatment for "good cause' 34 was made inapplicable
to psychosurgery and to ECT by requiring informed consent of the
patient prior to treatment. 135 The purpose of requiring informed
consent was to insure that consent is competent, informed, and
voluntary. 136 A review by three physicians was required to determine the patient's competence and the necessity and appropriateness of the proposed treatment.' 37 To obtain informed consent, the
law required in all cases notice of the risks of treatment to a rela-

128.

Aden v. Younger, 57 Cal. App. 3d 662, 667-68, 129 Cal. Rptr. 535, 538-39

(4th Dist. 1976).
129.

Act of Sept. 27, 1974, ch. 1534, 1974 Cal. Stats. 3459 (current version at
§§ 5325-5328.9 (West. Supp. 1978)).
Aden v. Younger, 57 Cal. App. 3d 662, 680-81, 129 Cal. Rptr. 535, 547 (4th

CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE

130.

Dist. 1976). For a discussion of the rights to treatment and to refuse treatment, see
notes 188-208 infra and accompanying text.
131. See Act of Sept. 27, 1974, ch. 1534, § 1, 1974 Cal. Stats. 3459 (current
version at CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5325 (West. Supp. 1978)).

132. Aden v. Younger, 57 Cal. App. 3d 662, 674, 680, 129 Cal. Rptr. 535, 54243, 547 (4th Dist. 1976).
133. For a discussion of the effects of institutionalization on voluntariness, see
notes 72-75 supra and accompanying text.
134. Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, ch. 1667, 1967 Cal. Stats. 4074, as amended by
Act of Sept. 27, 1974, ch. 1534, § 2, 1974 Cal. Stats. 3460 (current version at CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 5326.6 (West Supp. 1978)).
135. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5326.6 (West. Supp. 1978).

136. Aden v. Younger, 57 Cal. App. 3d 662, 680, 129 Cal. Rptr. 535, 547 (4th
Dist. 1976).
137. Act of Sept. 27, 1974, ch. 1534, § 2, 1974 Cal. Stats. 3460.
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tive or guardian as well as to the patient. 138 In addition, a system
39
of reporting was established to control abuses of patients' rights.1
Petitioners in Aden alleged that the statute is constitutionally
infirm for three reasons: (1) It violates the equal protection clause
because it classifies mental patients in an unreasonable manner by
requiring that of all ill patients, only mental patients are required
to receive full disclosure of the risks and possible side effects of
psychosurgery and ECT;140 (2) The procedures for informing the
patient so he may consent and the procedures for obtaining review
board approval of the proposed therapy violate due process because
the language is unconstitutionally vague;' 4 ' and (3) The statute
violates due process because a patient's constitutional rights of privacy, freedom of thought, and access to medical treatment are infringed without any "sufficient relation" to a compelling state inter142
est.
The court held that parts of the statutory sections 1on
43
psychosurgery and ECT were constitutional and parts were not,
and concluded that to make the infirm portion valid would entail a
complete redraft by the legislature of those sections. The court,
therefore, declared the entire section on psychosurgery and ECT
unconstitutional. 144
In dismissing the equal protection argument, the court stated
that mental patients are distinct from other patients because they
are more likely than other patients "to lack the ability to understand the nature of a medical procedure and appreciate its
risks."' 14 5 In addition, the court continued, their ability to voluntar-

138. Id.

139. Id. All treatments had to be recorded and treatment records were to be
available to the Director of Health and, with names concealed, to the Legislature.
This would prevent a physician from giving unnecessary treatments to patients and,
if carefully monitored, would prevent a doctor from recording treatments that were
never administered.
140. Aden v. Younger, 57 Cal. App. 3d 662, 672, 129 Cal. Rptr. 535, 542 (4th
Dist. 1976).
141. Id. at 673, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 542.
142. Id. For a discussion of these constitutional rights, see notes 167-202 infra
and accompanying text.
143. See Aden v. Younger, 57 Cal. App. 3d 662, 686, 129 Cal. Rptr. 535, 550-51
(4th Dist. 1976). The California Legislature promptly redrafted the statute to conform
to the Aden decision. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5325-5328.9 (West Supp.
1978).
144. See Aden v. Younger, 57 Cal. App. 3d 662, 686, 129 Cal. Rptr. 535, 550-51
(4th Dist 1976).
145. Id. at 674, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 542,
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ily accept treatment is questionable. 146 The court thereby extended
the Kaimowitz finding, that institutionalization causes a decrease in

the voluntariness of involuntarily committed patients, to those who
voluntarily commit themselves. The court noted that "voluntary" is
a label created by the legislature and "only means that the patient
did not formally protest hospitalization.- 14 7 The court concluded
that, under these circumstances, separate treatment of mental

patients rationally relates to the state's objective of assuring the

148
patients' statutory right to refuse treatment.
The court found, however, that the requirement that a procedure not be performed unless critically needed for the patient's wel-

fare 149 is unconstitutionally vague. 150 The court reached this conclusion because the degree of need required before psychosurgery

or ECT may be performed was left unspecified and could result in
patients with the same conditions being treated differently.
In its initial examination of the alleged due process violations,
the Aden court outlined the competing interests to be considered.
The state has an interest in protecting patients from "unwarranted,

unreasonable and unconsented-to invasions of body and mind."'1 51
Arrayed against this state interest is the patient's "right to medical
treatment."' 15 2 Requiring informed consent furthers the state's
compelling interest in protecting a patient against unnecessary
146. See id.
147. Id. at 674, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 543.
148. See id. Interestingly, the court held the state to different standards of
proof. To justify differentiating mental patients from other patients, the state was required to meet, and met, a "minimum rationality" burden, one that is relatively easy
to meet. However, in reviewing the constitutionality of the procedures to be followed before a patient could undergo psychosurgery or ECT, the state had to satisfy
the "compelling interest" test, a much greater burden, to justify infringing a patient's
rights. The decision in Aden was a direct result of the application by the court of
these two standards to different portions of the legislation.
149. Act of Sept. 27, 1974, ch. 1534, § 3, 1974 Cal. Stats. 3461 (current version
at CAL. ,VELF. & INST. CODE § 5326.6 (West Supp. 1978)).
150. Aden v. Younger, 57 Cal. App. 3d 662, 677, 129 Cal. Rptr. 535, 545 (4th
Dist. 1976).
151. Id. at 678, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 545-46.
152. Id. at 678, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 546. The right to privacy can refer both to the
right to select medical procedures as well as the right to freedom from intrusion into
the brain. Freedom of speech and thought can refer both to freedom to undergo
psychosurgery to enhance speech and thought, and to freedom to prevent tampering
with speech and thought by means of psychosurgery. Although the terms "right to
privacy" and "freedom of thought" might often be associated with the right to refuse
treatment, see, e.g., Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, 1 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 147 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1973), the Aden court associated these terms with the
right of access to treatment. See note 172 infra.
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treatment. However, the court found no state interest is furthered
by disclosing to a relative or guardian the information disclosed to
the patient. Furthermore, the requirement that a relative or guardian be so informed violates the patient's right to privacy. The court
reasoned that since the statute does not grant relatives standing to
assert the patient's rights, it is doubtful that disclosure to them
furthers protection of the patient's rights or prevents unnecessary
treatment. 153 For purposes of psychosurgery and ECT, the guardian of the mental patient's rights under both California legislation
154
and the Commission's recommendations is a board of review.
Preventing abuses of patients' rights is the stated purpose of
the reporting system. 155 The court upheld this provision, which
requires that when records are released to the legislature for use in
deliberations on mental health, the names of individual patients
must be deleted to protect their privacy.1 56
Perhaps the greatest contribution of the Aden decision to the
rights of the mentally ill is its discussion of review procedures designed to assure that a patient has given informed consent. The
Commission report relies heavily on the validity of the IRB to support its basic thesis that psychosurgery should be performed. The
proposed legislation, by totally banning psychosurgery, implicitly
takes the opposite view.
The court in Aden examined the process of assuring consent to
psychosurgery in the California statute as applied to three
categories of mental patients: those who are incompetent, those
who are involuntarily committed, and those who voluntarily commit themselves. 15 7 The review procedures 158 were declared valid
as to the incompetent patient because such an individual cannot
consent and the state has a compelling interest in protecting him
from the dangers of such procedures. 159 This, the court stated, justifies whatever right to privacy may be infringed by the release of
information about the patient to the review board. 160
153. Aden v. Younger, 57 Cal. App. 3d 662, 681, 129 Cal. Rptr. 535, 547 (4th
Dist. 1976).
154. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5326.6(d), 5326.7(6) (West Supp. 1978); Re-

port of the National Commission, supra note 5, at 26,329.
155. See note 139 supra.
156. See Aden v. Younger, 57 Cal. App. 3d 662, 681, 129 Cal. Rptr. 535, 547-48.
(4th Dist. 1976).
157. Id. at 682, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 548.
158. See note 137 supra and accompanying text.
159. Aden v. Younger, 57 Cal. App. 3d 662, 682, 129 Cal. Rptr. 535, 548 (4th
Dist. 1976).
160. Id.
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The procedures were also determined valid as to an involuntarily committed patient because the court held that the voluntariness of consent from such a patient can never be adequately confirmed. 16 1 The establishment of a board to make the treatment
decision is justified by the state's compelling interest in preventing
62
involuntary administration of psychosurgery.'
Finally, review of the recommendation by the patient's physician that psychosurgery be performed on a voluntarily committed
patient was declared proper. Even though the patient is competent
and voluntarily consents to the procedure, the importance of assuring that consent is informed and voluntary and the need to regulate
an experimental procedure justifies the legislature in removing the
63
decision from the sole discretion of the treating physician.1
The court considered consent to ECT separately because it
found that ECT was an accepted form of treatment and was not
experimental. 16 4 Its discussion of ECT highlights its view of the
nature of psychosurgery. The court held that the same considerations underlying its decision with regard to the performance of
psychosurgery on voluntarily and involuntarily committed patients
apply to the treatment of such individuals with ECT; it therefore
validated mandatory review procedures. 1 65 However, the court
stated that where informed consent is assured and the procedure is
not experimental, there is not the same need for review as where
informed consent is not assured and the procedure is experimental.
In the latter case, a substitute decisionmaker is required .66 On the
other hand, where consent is informed and voluntary, the decision
is best left to the doctor and patient since voluntarily committed
patients can give informed consent to a nonexperimental treatment.
161. Id. at 682-83, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 548. The court's recognition of the potential
use of psychosurgery as a control tool on unwilling patients may have been influ-

enced by disclosures that in 1968 several inmates from California prisons underwent
psychosurgery at the Vacaville Correctional Facility. The surgery was conducted
under an experimental state-funded program to eliminate violence from prisoners
who had a record of violent behavior in and out of prison and who were serious
management problems. The experiment was ended, without explanation, after three
operations.
162. Id. See Older, supra note 22, at 665; see generally Trotter, supra note 17.
163. Aden v. Younger, 57 Cal. App. 3d 662, 683, 129 Cal. Rptr. 535, 548-49 (4th
Dist. 1976).
164. See id. at 684, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 549. But see Informed Consent, supra note
14, at 747-52, 755, where the author indicates that ECT is just as experimental as
psychosurgery and that the same review procedures should apply to both.
165. See Aden v. Younger, 57 Cal. App. 3d 662, 683, 129 Cal. Rptr. 535, 549
(4th Dist. 1976).
166. Id.
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Since the state has no compelling interest which overrides the infringement of a patient's right to privacy, the mandatory review of
consent, given by voluntarily admitted patients, to undergo ECT
was found unconstitutional. 167 The court did not view election to
undergo ECT differently than election to receive an injection of
antibiotics. The decision emphasizes the court's belief that psychosurgery is experimental.
In amending the statute to conform with the decision, the
California legislature stated that psychosurgery may be performed
only after all other treatments have been attempted. The Commission unfortunately did not declare psychosurgery to be a treatment
of last resort. However, the Commission went beyond the Aden
decision and recommended mandatory judicial review of all IRB
approvals of psychosurgery, at least for involuntarily committed patients. 168 The California statute provides for mandatory judicial review only where an involuntarily confined mental patient consents
to undergo ECT.169 Curiously in light of Aden, the statute does not
require judicial review of consent by any patient to psychosur0
gery. 17
OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

The Aden court referred to several constitutional issues in its

discussion of informed consent. One of the state's interests is protecting a patient's right to refuse treatment.71 On the other hand,
the patient's interests include access to treatment and maintenance
72
of his right to privacy and freedom of thought.1
Right of Mentation
The Kaimowitz court held that there exists a fundamental right
to freedom of mentation. 173 The bases of this freedom are the first

167. See id.
168. Report of the National Commission, supra note 5, at 26,330.
169. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5326.7 (West Supp. 1978).
170. Id. § 5326.6.
171. See note 130 supra and accompanying text.
172. Id. The Aden court viewed the right to privacy and freedom of thought
from the perspective of a patient who wants to undergo psychosurgery and does not
want information disclosed to the review board. The issues in the analysis which
follows, see notes 173-208 infra and accompanying text, are examined similarly to the
way courts holding against psychosurgery view them-from the viewpoint of the patient who asserts these rights to be free of state or hospital imposed psychosurgery.
173.

Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, 1 MENTAL DISABILITY L.
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amendment freedom of communication and the first and fifth
amendments' right to privacy as applied to the states through the
fourteenth amendment.1 74 The court stated: "To the extent that the
First Amendment protects the dissemination of ideas and the expression of thoughts, it equally must protect the individual's right
to generate ideas."'1 75 The court reasoned that "[w]ithout the latter
protection, the former is meaningless."' 176 Psychosurgery cannot
pass constitutional muster, the court stated, because it often "leads
to the blunting of emotions, the deafening of memory . . . and
177
limits the ability to generate new ideas."'
Several pronouncements on the first amendment by the Supreme Court, relied upon in Kaimowitz, illustrate the connection of
mentation with free speech. In Abrams v. United States, 17 8 Justice
Holmes stated that the basis of the first amendment is that free
trade in ideas is the best means to improve society. 179 In Whitney
0 Justice Brandeis asserted:
v. California,18
Those who won our independence believed that the final
end of the State was to make men free to develop their faculties;
and that in its government the deliberative forces should prevail
over the arbitrary .... They believed that freedom to think as
you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to
the discovery and spread of political truth; that without free
speech and assembly discussion would be futile; . .. [and] that
the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people ....181
A second strand in case law supports the proposition that the
right to privacy includes the protection of mental autonomy. As
early as 1886, the Supreme Court declared that the essence of the
REP. 147, 151 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1973). Mentation refers to emotions, memory, and the

ability to generate new ideas. Id. at 152.

174. Id. at 152.
175. Id. at 151. The court continued:
"We are free only if we know, and so in proportion to our knowledge. There
is no freedom without choice, and there is no choice without knowledge,or [none] that is [not] illusory. [Implicit,] therefore, in the very notion of
liberty is the liberty of the mind to absorb and to beget."
Id. (quoting B.N. CARDOZO, The Paradoxes of Legal Science, in SELECTED WRITINGS
OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO 317 (M. Hall ed. 1947)).
176. Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, 1 MENTAL DISABILITY L.
REP. 147, 152 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1973).
177. Id.
178. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
179. Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
180. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
181. Id. at 375 (emphasis added).
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fourth and fifth amendments is the protection of the sanctity of the
individual.' 8 2 In his well-known dissent in Olmstead v. United
States, 18 3 Justice Brandeis declared that the fourth and fifth
amendments illustrate that the framers recognized an individual's
right to privacy:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to
protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions
and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of
184
rights and the right most valued by civilized men.
Moreover, in Griswold v. Connecticut,8 5 the Court recognized a
fundamental right to privacy as the constitutional basis for deciding
the issue before it.
These two threads came together in Stanley v. Georgia.186 In
Stanley the Court recognized the individual's right to be free from
thought control and found that privacy of the mind is necessary in
a society which strongly values speech, communication, and individuality. An intrusion into one's intellect is an intrusion into one's
constitutionally protected right of privacy. If one is not protected in
his thoughts, behavior, personality, and identity, then the right to
8 7
privacy becomes meaningless.'

Right to Treatment
The Commission report relied heavily on a statement in Aden
that state regulation of psychosurgery places obstacles in the path
of those patients who may need and desire psychosurgery by re182. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
183. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
184. Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

185. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
186. 394 U.S. 557 (1969). The Court stated: "Our whole constitutional heritage
rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men's minds ....
Whatever the power of the state to control public dissemination of ideas inimical to
the public, morality, it cannot constitutionally premise legislation on the desirability
of controlling a person's private thoughts." Id. at 565-66.
187.

See Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, 1 MENTAL DISABILITY L.

REP. 147 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1973). The Kaimowitz court restricted its holding to involuntarily confined mental patients. However, this principle could be properly extended to all individuals.
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viewing and possibly reversing their choice to undergo the operation; these obstacles impair their freedom to submit to a particular
treatment.'18 8 The Commission recognized the variance between its
view, that both voluntarily and involuntarily committed patients
can give informed consent, 189 and the Kaimowitz decision. Although it agreed with the Kaimowitz court that institutionalization
may diminish the ability of mental patients to make free choices, 190
the Commission concluded that the right of a patient to seek benefit from new treatments should not be denied on the basis of an
irrebuttable presumption of diminished capacity or by prohibiting
third party consent.191
The right of an institutionalized mental patient to receive
treatment was argued before the Supreme Court in O'Connor v.
Donaldson.19 2 In Donaldson the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit had held that an involuntarily confined mental patient has a
right to treatment or release. 193 The Supreme Court, however, did
not reach the right to treatment issue in order to affirm the Fifth
Circuit's decision. The Court instead focused on the constitutional
right to liberty and held that "a State cannot constitutionally confine without more [than mere custodial care] a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself or
with the help of willing and responsible family members or
94
friends."1
The Fifth Circuit had previously decided that mental patients
do have a right to treatment. Relying on the District of Columbia
case of Rouse v. Cameron,19 5 in which Chief Judge Bazelon based
the right to treatment on statutory grounds, 1 96 the Fifth Circuit
188. Report of the National Commission, supra note 5, at 26,322 (citing Aden v.
Younger, 57 Cal. App. 3d 662, 679-80, 129 Cal. Rptr. 535, 546-47 (4th Dist. 1976)).

The Aden decision did not state that mental patients have a right to treatment. However, the court implied that it accepted that proposition by stating that denial by the
state of an individual's choice to undergo psychosurgery must be justified by a compelling state interest. Generally, a state must show a compelling interest to override
a fundamental right. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
189. Report of the National Commission, supra note 5, at 26,330.
190. Id. at 26,331.
191. Id.
192. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
193. Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974), aff'd, 422 U.S. 563
(1975).
194. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975). For a detailed discussion of Donaldson, see 4 HOFSTRA L. REv. 511 (1976).
195. 373 F.2d 451, 453 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
196. Id. at 454. See D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 21-562 (West 1967) which provides:
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in Wyatt v. Stickney 1 97 held that when individuals are involuntarily
civilly committed, "they unquestionably have a constitutional
right to receive such individual treatment as will give each of them
a realistic opportunity to be cured or to improve his or her mental
condition." 198 Thus, according to this court, the only justification
for involuntary hospitalization from a constitutional standpoint is
treatment.' 99 In the absence of "[a]dequate and effective treatment, the hospital is transformed 'into a penitentiary where one
can be held indefinitely without conviction for any offense.' "200
This court further stated: "To deprive any citizen of his or her liberty upon the altruistic theory that the confinement is for humane
therapeutic reasons and then fail to provide adequate treatment
20 1
violates the very fundamentals of due process."
The Commission would have provided firmer ground for its
recommendations had it advanced the argument presented in
Wyatt-that patients have a right to treatment and that if all other
treatments have been exhausted, they should have the right to
undergo psychosurgery. The only question then remaining would
have been whether psychosurgery is "adequate and effective treatment" as required in Wyatt v. Stickney. 20 2
The Commission might have tried to argue from its findings
that psychosurgery provides a "realistic opportunity to be cured or
to improve [the patient's] mental condition," 20 3 and that the right
to treatment requires that psychosurgery be used if a patient has
given informed consent. The problem is that the studies performed
for the Commission do not support that proposition; by the Com-

"A person hospitalized in a public hospital for a mental illness shall, during his
hospitalization, be entitled to medical and psychiatric care and treatment."
197. 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala.), upon submission of proposed standards by
defendants, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (1971), enforced, 344 F. Supp. 373, enforced as to
added plaintiffs, 344 F. Supp. 387 (1972), aff'd sub nom. Wyatt v. Anderholt, 503
F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1973).
198. Id. at 784.
199. Id.
200. Id. (quoting Ragsdale v. Overholder, 281 F.2d 943, 950 (D.C. Cir. 1960)).
The majority of inmates in the hospital involved had been involuntarily committed.
However, the court's reasoning should apply to anyone who is committed voluntarily
or involuntarily since the purpose of institutionalization is treatment. Id.
201. Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 785 (M.D. Ala.), upon submission of
proposed standardsby defendants, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (1971), enforced, 344 F. Supp.
373, enforced as to added plaintiffs, 344 F. Supp. 387 (1972), aff'd sub nom. Wyatt
v. Anderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1973).
202. See note 200 supra and accompanying text.
203. See note 199 supra and accompanying text.
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mission's own words, they merely rebut any presumption that
psychosurgery never works. 20 4 Thus, the right to treatment argument presented in Wyatt would not have been appropriate in the
Commission report. Indeed, because it has not been shown that
psychosurgery provides a patient with a "realistic opportunity to be
cured or to improve his or her mental condition," 2 0 5 a patient may
not, or perhaps should not, have the same right of access to
psychosurgery as he does to other less intrusive forms of therapy.
Concomitant with the right to treatment is the right to refuse
treatment. The doctrine of informed consent and the right to mentation form the basis for this latter right. The basic purpose of the review procedures discussed in this note is to assure that a patient
has not been coerced into submitting to treatment he does not
truly wish to undergo. The right to mentation, the right to privacy,
and the freedom to communicate provide the constitutional basis
for the right of a patient to refuse a particular treatment. 20 6 Unless
a patient is given the right to refuse treatment, the promise of a
right to treatment that will cure or improve the patient's condition
is empty since it subjects the patient to whatever the institution
prescribes, regardless of this prescription's effectiveness and
risk. 20 7 Thus, review procedures are necessary to assure informed
consent; judicial review is additionally required since it is ultimately the only forum in which a patient's rights can be fully pro20 8
tected.
CONCLUSION

The Commission was overzealous in its advocacy of psychosurgery and was too quick to criticize Kaimowitz. Its own studies reveal that the efficacy of psychosurgery is not yet known. 20 9 The
Commission may have overlooked some of the deleterious side effects of psychosurgery on the patients it examined. 2 10 The Commission failed to consider adequately the effect of institutionaliza204. Report of the National Commission, supra note 5, at 26,329; See text accompanying notes 39 & 98 supra.
205. Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 785 (M.D. Ala.), upon submission of

proposed standardsby defendants, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (1971), enforced, 344 F. Supp.
373, enforced as to added plaintiffs, 344 F. Supp. 387 (1972), aff'd sub nom. Wyatt
v. Anderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1973).
206. See notes 173-177 supra and accompanying text.
207. See notes 85-88 supra and accompanying text.
208. See note 121 supra and accompanying text.
209. Report of the National Commission, supra note 5, at 26,329.
210. See notes 95-97 supra and accompanying text.
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tion on the voluntariness of any patient and on a patient's ability to
provide informed consent.2 1 ' The Commission report does, however, have two positive aspects. First, it recommends mandatory
IRB review for all proposed psychosurgery. 2 12 This is designed to
assure informed consent. Whether it goes far enough in protecting
a patient's right to effective treatment and right to refuse treatment
is open to question. Mandatory judicial review is recommended in
the case of involuntarily committed patients;2 13 the same considerations that led to this recommendation also suggest the conclusion
that judicial review should be required for proposed psychosurgery
on voluntarily committed patients as well.2 14 The report's second
positive point lies in its recognition that psychosurgery can be used
as a means of social control, but should not be used for such purposes. 215 That psychosurgery can be used for social control supports
the argument that two levels of review, the IRB and the courts, are
absolutely necessary.
The legislation proposed by Representative Stokes is poorly
drafted and contains the seeds of its own destruction. The bill excludes from its definition of psychosurgery "the treatment of a
known and diagnosed physical disease of the brain. "216 This creates
a loophole which would permit a doctor to perform any psychosurgical procedure without review merely by stating that a patient has a
particular disease. This bill, therefore, does not ban psychosurgery
at all. Indeed, if this proposal were enacted, the very horrors which
the Nuremberg standards 2 17 sought to prevent and which Representative Stokes so greatly fears could easily come to pass. Even if
Representative Stokes' bill did ban psychosurgery, it merits rejection. By completely banning psychosurgery, the bill denies mental
patients access to it at some time in the future when advances in
scientific research and technology may result in psychosurgical procedures that will no longer be experimental and can properly be
called treatment.
The findings of the Kaimowitz court, concerning the medical
profession's lack of knowledge about psychosurgery and the del211. See notes 104 & 105 supra and accompanying text.
212. Report of the National Commission, supra note 5, at 26,329-30.
213. Id. at 26,330.
214. See notes 121-124 supra and accompanying text; see also Bamhart, Pinkerton, & Roth, supra note 8, at 80.
215. Report of the National Commission, supra note 5, at 26,329.
216. H.R. 7371, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. H4830 (daily ed. May 23,
1977).
217. See note 69 supra and accompanying text.
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eterious effects of institutionalization on the capacity of mental patients to exercise free choice, mandate the conclusion that the
promise psychosurgery offers is perhaps a generation away. Until
dramatic advances are achieved, its use should be restricted to an
experimental procedure of last resort performed only after multilevel scrutiny, including judicial review. Until medical science
climbs out of the Cuckoo's Nest, the perils outweigh the promise.
Steven C. Spronz
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